Prosecutor v Omar al Bashir
As reported, the Pretrial Chamber of International Criminal Court has earlier today confirmed an arrest warrant for Omar al Bashir, the incumbent president of Sudan, for crimes against humanity and war crimes but not for crime of genocide against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethinc groups. Albeit a number of practitioners and experts of international criminal law foretold that the Pretrial Chamber would not issue an arrest warrant in relation to crime of genocide against al Bashir, it appears that such reasoning rests on shaky grounds. Article 58 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute provides that ‘the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, …, it is satisfied that: there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’. As explained by Kevin and Marko on their respective blogs this amounts to very low standard of proof. Nonetheless, the Pretrial Chamber held that:
205. In the view of the Majority, when all materials provided by the Prosecution in support of the Prosecution Application are analysed together, and consequently, the above-mentioned findings are jointly assessed, the Majority cannot but conclude that the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the GoS acted with a dolus specialis/specific intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups is not the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn therefrom.
206. As a result, the Majority finds that the materials provided by the Prosecution in support of the Prosecution Application fail to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the GoS acted with dolus specialis/spetific intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, and consequently no warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir shall be issued in relation to counts 1 to 3.
It follows from above paragraphs that the Chamber somewhat confusingly employed two standards of proof. Firstly, the Court employs in paragraph 205 the notion of ‘reasonable conclusion’, whereas it then moves in the ensuing paragraph to the Statute’s standard of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’. It would be helpful if the Chamber would have explained whether it intentionally employed different wording in those paragraphs and whether it believes that ‘reasonable conclusion’ amounts to different standard as ‘reasonable grounds’ standard. It seems questionable in the light of the affluence of evidence gathered in past years that the Prosecutor failed to produce evidence which would show reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir acted with specific intent to destroy the three ethnic groups in questions. It remains to be seen if the Prosecutor decides to challenge this part of decision on appeal.
Last 5 posts by Jernej Letnar Černič
- Council of Europe Report on Human Rights and Business - October 16th, 2010
- The ICC at Eight: Assessing US policy and international criminal law: reciprocal influences - September 25th, 2010
- The Council of Europe's work on secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees in Europe - August 4th, 2010
- Provisional resolution on ‘Legal remedies for human rights violations in the North-Caucasus Region’ - June 4th, 2010
- Council of Europe and Fight against Sea Piracy - May 6th, 2010